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Ab ;STRAKT
One of the most significant achievements of the «anthropological turn» of XIX-XX cen­turies philosophy, as well as of modern sociology, law and other disciplines is the devel­
opment of the idea and images of human dignity as a value-ideological foundation of social 
development, a tool to cope with and manage conflicts in the society. Implicit contradic­
tions of modern concepts of human dignity (undeveloped nature of dignity, mixing up the 
dignity and the assessment of merits, the primacy of the activity approach, etc.) hinder the 
implementation of the principle of dignity as a regulator of social practice. We need a new 
theory of dignity (may call it constructive theory), which is expected to replace the descrip­
tive approach and aims to synthesize the idea and images of human dignity into a single 
value-rational and emotional complex supported by the mechanism of self-consciousness of 
the individual and the human community, and by the reflection of dignity.
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Ан НОТАЦИЯ
Весомым достижением «антропологического поворота» философской мысли XIX- XX вв., а также современной социологии, теории права и др. дисциплин является 
разработка идеи и образа человеческого достоинства как ценностно-мировоззренче­
ского основания социального развития, преодоления конфликтных ситуаций в обще­
стве. Имплицитные противоречия современных концепций достоинства человека (не­
разработанность природы достоинства, совмещение достоинства с оценкой, примат 
деятельностного подхода и др.) затрудняют имплементацию принципа достоинства 
как регулятива социальной практики. Необходима новая (конструктивная) теория 
достоинства, которая должна прийти на смену дескриптивным подходам и призвана 
синтезировать идею и образы человеческого достоинства в единый рационально-цен­
ностный и эмоциональный комплекс, поддерживаемый механизмами самосознания 
личности и человеческого сообщества, и в частности, рефлексией достоинства.
Клю чевы е слова: человеческое достоинство; деятельностный подход; дес­криптивная концепция достоинства; конструктивная концепция достоинства; са- 
мовосприятие; интроспекция; самопонимание; рефлексия достоинства.
22
№2 2015
Т Т А У Ч н ы И
РЕЗУЛЬТАТ
Myakchilo S.A.
REFLECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY FROM THE DESCRIPTIVE 
TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH Сетевой научно-практический журнал
1. Introduction
Latest developments in post-Soviet space 
as well as in the Mid-East area, especially the 
Ukrainian crisis and the atrocities of the “Islamic 
state”, demonstrate how acute is the risk of rapid 
dehumanization, massive violence in the course 
of civil conflict. Despite the thorough theoretical 
work over the concepts and value complexes of 
humanism, mutual understanding, non-violence 
etc. in modern philosophy, sociology, conflictolo- 
gy, ethical studies, these concepts to a considerable 
extent fail to serve as landmarks and moral criteria 
of social life.
Contemporary humanities are still in need of 
some pivotal idea or concept that would be based 
on a solid philosophic and argumentative ground, 
would be in correspondence with traditional reli­
gious outlook and values and would also possess 
a developed system of theoretic and pragmatic 
implications, moral and emotional supplements 
that would hopefully stop the humanity from av­
alanche-like beastification. One of such concepts 
that has the peculiar tradition of problematization 
and at the same time deserves a more thorough 
transdisciplinary approach is the idea and notion 
of human dignity.
Theoretical arrangement associated with this 
idea is one of the most significant achievements of 
the “anthropological turn” in post-classical philos­
ophy. At the same contemporary tradition in the 
understanding of human dignity inherits the spir­
it and topical fields of reasoning dignity in Plato’s, 
Aristotle’s and the stoics’ teachings, and reflects 
certain traits of Renaissance humanism, French 
Enlightenment and of course the German tran­
scendental school. In the meanwhile, it was merely 
the post-classic era that established the possibility 
to argue that the idea of dignity and its theoretic 
definitions must be supplemented with a deliber­
ate imagery of dignity to become the true and ef­
fective regulation of social life.
2. Research findings
Deliberating the idea and image of dignity, 
post-classical philosophy does close a sort of his­
torical “circle”. In ancient philosophy, we start 
with a visual demonstration of dignity in the mind­
set and “modus vivendi” of a thoroughly thinking 
(philosophizing) person. Over time, we come to 
the idea, typical for Modern-era thought, that dig­
nity is a theoretical principle, rational basis of life 
and human interaction. Dignity as a principle fits 
into the concept of the “world as it must” neces­
sary for the expedient transformation of the “world
that is”. Finally, the post-classical philosophy, from 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to the existentialists 
and Marxists, speaks of dignity as precisely the 
ability to synthesize the idea and the image, to em­
body the intelligible principle in the practice, seek­
ing to convert, organize, subordinate to the moral 
law chaotic, often absurd, unjust or inauthentic 
world. Dignity is therefore more than a principle 
and more than a behavioral trait: it is merely the 
human capacity for responsibility (first of all, to the 
self) and for “wholeness” of life provided by (and 
supplied with) the internal moral law, the criterion 
of right and justice.
One may say that such understanding of dig­
nity is not exclusively “humanitarian” anymore. 
It can be interpreted broadly -  as far as to say 
that dignity is in general a quality of a structural 
unit in a system of relations mediated by symbol­
ic exchange, such as communication mediated 
by values. Such dignity is an attribute of person 
(merely a person capable of communicating and 
cooperating with others and at the same time of 
deliberate isolation from them) but may also be 
a sign of a cultural phenomenon, an ideology, 
a scientific discipline or a teaching. No wonder 
that the modern Russian researcher A. Bikbov 
entitled his essay in the sociology of philosoph­
ical knowledge (or exactly on how philosophers 
promote themselves in the scientific community) 
«Philosophical dignity as an object of study» [1]. 
And for example Harvard professor M. Rosen in 
his book “The dignity of history and meaning”
[2] analyzes dignity as a concept entwined in the 
disciplinary and cultural ties, including philos­
ophy, law, politics, ethics, theology and specific 
religious beliefs. Moreover, he sees dignity as a 
means of clarifying the legal, political, ethical 
and religious discourse by placing it in a particu­
lar social context.
Below, we will still focus on the most obvious 
mode of dignity -  the dignity of the human being. 
Post-classical humanities boast rich variety of par­
adigms of the human in which notions of human 
dignity are also different. In particular, we may 
notice the similarities and differences between the 
existential-phenomenological philosophy, which 
perceives through the German neo-Kantianism es­
sential features of Kant’s approach to the phenom­
enon of humanity, and socio-critical tradition (in­
cluding neo-Marxism and post-Marxism), focused 
on the distinction between true and alienated hu­
man existence. Substantial contribution to the un­
derstanding of the dignity is made by structuralism
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and post-structuralism, with its attention to sym­
bolic determinants of self-identification.
For contemporary Russian authors, it is typi­
cal to understand dignity as “a characteristic of a 
person from the standpoint of his intrinsic value, 
correspondence to one’s predestination” [3]. This 
definition unveils the paradox: to what extent can 
we talk about “predestination” of a person having 
not determined the ontological grounds of his dig­
nity (and of his, to say so, “destiny” as well)? And 
if we even put such goal before ourselves, doesn’t 
it mean that the ontology of dignity relies on the 
notion of “predestination” as some transcenden­
tal condition, irrational entity, something like 
“ацаукп” or“dao”?
To circumvent this difficulty, post-classic 
thought states that the source of dignity is to be 
searched for in no impersonal environment but in 
the ontology of individual. Under this approach, we 
would rather replace “predestination” with “voca­
tion” and thus get the notion of dignity as thinking, 
behavior and values of the self-actualizing person­
ality. Self-actualized people, -  says A. Maslow -  
involve into something that is outside themselves. 
They are committed to this business, it is some­
thing very valuable to them -  a kind of vocation 
(see: [4, p. 110]). From here follows the idea of the 
activity-related nature of human dignity: it is not a 
prerequisite of human existence, but above all the 
opportunity and goal. Human activity that meets 
certain criteria does objectifiy and event thingify 
dignity; thereby the activity itself acquires the sta­
tus of worthiness. On the other hand, the lack of 
activity is sometimes harmful for dignity.
Linking the ideas of human dignity and activi­
ty, we see that in post-classical conceptual contexts 
dignity appears in two ways: first, as a phenome­
non (a feature of a person, an integral indicator of 
one’s self-understanding and self-perception), and 
then, as a principle (an essential trait of human 
co-existence, enclosing an imperative of behavior). 
It is important that dignity involves not only the 
self-determination in social reality (the latter is al­
ways given to a person in a certain view and implic­
itly guides the mind in a certain direction), but also 
in the wider frame of reference. This is self-identifi­
cation within history, in politics and culture, in the 
context framed by the image of “all mankind”, the 
sense of humanity and its destiny. That’s probably 
why Kant spoke of the value constitution of culture 
due to the fact that the existence of values as such 
is only possible by virtue of the human relationship 
to the world, “as a measure of humanity and free­
dom” (see: [5, p. 7]), and “morality, and humanity 
as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity” [6,
p. 212].
Apart from them the mentioned “predestina­
tion paradox”, which is more or less eliminable by 
the activity approach, some more difficulties exist.
First, it is the question of nature and (or) so- 
cio-historic and anthropological genesis of human 
dignity and rights, dialectics of their relations. Ac­
tivity approach is the attitude that merely unites 
the question of dignity with the problem of human 
rights. In other words, the notion human rights 
gets its precise sense due to the fact that the human 
being, representing activity, involves in commu­
nication, cooperation and possible contradiction 
with the other. Still, as M. Rosen notes, attention 
to human rights does not only make the prob­
lem of dignity more distinctive, but paradoxically 
draws attention away from the non-codified right 
of some other nature -  the right to perception and 
acknowledgement of one’s dignity in the other’s 
mind, emotions and world-outlook (apart from 
what he or she is actually doing). In fact, the matter 
is of the “right to be respected”, which derives from 
dignity and stands for premise of “worthy relation” 
to the other both in thought and deed.
In a most clear way this correspondence be­
tween dignity and rights is demonstrated by the 
“Statement of Ethical Principles” adopted by the 
International Federation of Social Workers. It is 
stated there that social work is based on the “. 
inherent worth and dignity of all people, and the 
rights that follow from this” [7]. This is quite a bold 
declaration, because dignity is not just mentioned 
along with the rights, but is uniquely determined 
as a source of rights (hence there’s only one step to 
the understanding of dignity as a source of law in 
general).
Dignity is often described as the human’s con­
stant attribute. But, as R. Apresian in particular 
argues, the idea of dignity forms in the course of 
history as not exactly as estimative but more as an 
imperative characteristic. Human being is granted 
dignity (this is the attitude of Christianity in pri­
vate) and he must be worthy of this divine gift. Thus 
the notion of inherency of dignity intertwines with 
the notion of “endowment”. The latter doesn’t al­
ways necessarily mean possession, at least not the 
one we can explicitly state. S. Darwall writes that 
“although Kant sometimes conceives of dignity as 
involving a standing every person has to demand, 
or ‘exact’ respect, Kant also treats dignity as a val­
ue we can all achieve, but only when we properly
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exercise our capacity for moral choice” [8, p. 8]. As 
a result, dignity in contemporary thought is first 
of all potential of a human and a peculiar task for 
him, a test for the whole mankind. Not accidentally 
M. Heidegger emphasized that “higher humanistic 
definition of a human being has not yet reached the 
true dignity of man” [9, p. 328].
Another difficulty arises as the question about 
the scope of implementation of dignity as a prin­
ciple. They sometimes speak about “dignity of hu­
man” and “dignity of person / personality” as of 
notions that differ in degree of generality. Socio­
logical case studies introduce the idea of corporate, 
or group, dignity derived from the phenomenon of 
group solidarity and mutual coincidence of person­
al dispositions of members of the group (see: [10]). 
The concept of the “dignity of human life” evolve in 
the context of modern bioethics, etc.
Still more difficulties are caused by the ne­
cessity to introduce the idea of human dignity to 
the topical area of axiology. The Preamble of the 
United Nations Charter places into the one synon­
ymous row “faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and in the equal 
rights of nations large and small”. It is peculiar that 
“dignity and worth” act here as mutually supple­
mentary attributes. The logic of the authors of the 
document is probably that it’s scarcely enough to 
nominate respect for the individual through the 
“dignity” or “value” alone, but only through their 
synthesis.
There is certain history behind this thought. 
The idea of dignity is intertwined not only with 
the concept of value, but also with the idea of 
evaluation: that means to “evaluate” oneself, 
to look for evaluation (appreciation) from the 
other, to take an external estimate as adequate 
or abandon, to overcome it. Self-assessment of 
one’s dignity, especially critical one, seeming­
ly confers person to certain moral advantage or 
“power”. And nevertheless, according to many 
philosophers of post-classical era, it is import­
ant to completely separate evaluation of dignity 
from the recognition of it. Even if a person is rec­
ognized in his / her dignity, not every such rec­
ognition is all right, for it can be even humbling, 
as when awarded conditionally («He is worthy 
because he is such a... / has done something...»). 
“It is time to understand, finally, that acknowl­
edging something as “value” deprives the evalu­
ated of its dignity, -  M. Heidegger writes. -  This 
means: because of assessing something as a val­
ue the estimated object begins to exist only as a 
subject of human evaluation” [9, p. 34-344].
But no matter how we try to protect the idea of 
“pure dignity” within its own theoretical field, in 
practice this approach is not quite applicable. As, 
for instance, J. Habermas notes, in actual prob­
lematic situations the sense of human dignity inev­
itably involves pragmatic connotations -  not cen­
tral, but certainly significant. They are connected 
with the idea of actually checkable value, primar­
ily through the self-esteem of a person, but also 
in the context of assessments given by others. In 
philosophical and political discourse human dig­
nity and its socially acceptable personality treats 
(some “personal achievements” or “merits”) are 
quite often identified with each other. Based on 
this principle, in particular, the ideology of meri­
tocracy, the origins of which are contained in the 
works of M. Young [11]. However attractive in it­
self, his ideas leave many questions in what con­
cerns implementation. Their popularity testifies to 
the problem state of the political and legal identi­
ty of society, the discrepancy between self-esteem 
and its regulatory mechanisms, such as represen­
tative democracy. Even in a democratic society, 
and merely in it, “the appearance of meritocratic 
discourse that resembles that power should belong 
to the worthy is a sign of an impending crisis of le­
gitimacy” [12].
The mentioned difficulty is driven by the effort 
of many thinkers and public figures to lead the idea 
of dignity out of the shadows on intuitive notion of 
“natural” hierarchy of merits as a system of more 
and less “worthy” social statuses. This is not an 
easy task to fulfill, because the status hierarchy, ob­
servable in the animal world as well, is apparently 
deeply rooted in the psyche of a human being. And 
still many modern social philosophers, say for in­
stance J. Waldron and M. Dan-Cohen in their work 
“Dignity, Status and Rights”, note that it is more 
productive to speak of dignity in terms of achiev­
ing equally high status for as much people than to 
abandon the discourse of statuses at all (see: [13]).
Here it should be mentioned again that activ­
ity approach is also related to understanding of 
human dignity as a source of social action and the 
basis of law. This approach is reflected in particu­
lar in the Article 1 of the Basic Law for the Feder­
al Republic of Germany of 1949. It stated that the 
inviolability of human dignity and human rights 
is a peremptory basis “inviolable and inalienable 
human rights as the basis of every community, of 
peace and of justice in the world”. More concise
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formulation is given in the Constitution of the Re­
public of Belarus (Art. 25 -  “The state shall ensure 
the freedom, integrity and dignity of the person”), 
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Art. 
31 -  “Human dignity shall be protected by the 
state. Nothing can be the basis for its derogation”). 
Ultimately, modern researchers note: despite very 
different understandings of what is included in the 
set of inalienable human rights and to what divi­
sions (“generations”) they should be systematized, 
we find the point of convergence of multiple legal 
traditions and systems in the very understanding 
of what dignity is and how it should be protected. 
This implies that the dignity is in fact a catch-all 
category, even more applicable for understanding 
and dialogue between civilizations and legal cul­
tures than “human rights” in their European sense.
We would specifically comment on the ap­
proach implemented in the Constitution of the Re­
public of Poland, where it is said that “the natural 
and inalienable dignity of the person is the source 
of rights and freedoms of human and citizen. It is 
inviolable and its respect for and protection are the 
responsibility of public authorities”. The self-ap­
plying reflexive ratio is remarkable here: dignity is 
“the main motive and justification for the existence 
of rights and freedoms” [14], but the very notion of 
dignity is introduced primarily by reference to the 
rights and freedoms. One of the first who put these 
concepts in such a “reverse” order was J.-J. Rous­
seau, who famously remarked that “give up one’s 
freedom means to renounce one’s human dignity, 
abandon one’s human rights and even his duties”. 
Due to this ratio human dignity is often spoken of 
as primarily the civil dignity -  readiness for civ­
il action aimed at protecting one’s and common 
rights.
But doesn’t this in the long run imply that 
dignity is a metaphysic substance or a simula­
crum of sort, always constantly appearing and 
being referred to in its otherness but having no 
own true being? To answer this partly provoca­
tive question we must mention the problem of 
“scope” or “limits” of human dignity at the con­
ceptual, practical and reflexive level. The history 
of mankind gives us many examples of what can 
be called “acquisition” of dignity in thought, ac­
tion, decision. It is easy to recall instances when 
frankly inhuman treatment did not deprive the 
victim of “inner core”, which meant for him/ 
her following the internal criteria of authentici­
ty and correctness. But there are also numerous 
examples where people in similar circumstances
demonstrated complete loss of such a criterion, 
so to say, betrayed themselves.
Search for some common rule in each of such 
cases determines the request for transition from 
descriptive concept of dignity to constructive 
one. Characteristic feature of the first is the de­
scription and interpretation of “dignity experi­
ence”. The second focuses on the formulation of 
the decisive conditions of dignity, the transition 
from the experience of “non-esteem” to “dig­
nity” and also (which surely cannot be omitted 
from study) from esteem back to indignity. Sam­
ples of the descriptive approach are there in the 
theories of G. Pico della Mirandola, B. Pascal, 
in post-classical era -  for instance, in H. Berg­
son’s works. The constructive approach derives 
primarily from the works of I. Kant. Among 
the thinkers who sought to follow this pattern 
in post-classical era was M. Heidegger with his 
idea of dignity as “putting the humanity at the 
service of man”. Echoes of this idea can be heard 
particularly in the theory of L. Fuller who talks 
about the “inner morality of law”, which implies 
such qualities of legislation as clarity, consisten­
cy, immutability of the language, the orientation 
for the future. Dignity should therefore be seen 
not just as a prerequisite for the law, but also as a 
criterion of “effective humanism” of legislation. 
A theory based on the constructive concept of 
dignity would describe the principles of activity, 
communication, management that would make 
human dignity true regulation of social life.
Relying on considerations that have been giv­
en about the image and idea of human dignity, can 
we formulate the most crucial requirements for the 
constructive theory of human dignity?
First of all, such theory should be formulat­
ed on the basis of the analysis of peculiar cog- 
nitive-and-value environment in which dignity 
grows, especially the analysis of dignity-value 
complex. This environment is in fact nothing but 
self-consciousness or self-awareness of a personal­
ity, a social group, a nation.
Merely in the context of self-consciousness 
dignity ceases to be perceived as an abstract goal, 
or some transcendentalia. Instead, it can be mas­
tered as an important motive of concrete actions of 
personal, professional and primarily sociopolitical 
scope. Mind the eloquent citation from V. Stolin’s 
work: “As phenomena of consciousness, duty, re­
sponsibility, honor, dignity, conscience... concret­
ize for social individual... such moral values. as 
good, justice, and humanity. These phenomena
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are. a form of expression of the most important 
feature of the motivational sphere of the human, 
because they relate to the fact that with their high­
est moral content these motives lead outside his 
individual existence. and connect with the prob­
lems of epoch, of society in a whole” [15]. Not by 
chance the most advanced human rights codes his­
torically evolved in those cultures where the ma­
trix of philosophical understanding of the world 
and human’s place in it used to rest on the idea of 
sovereignty of self, on special ontological status of 
the active subject.
Second, identifying of dignity should be based 
on the understanding of relations between the idea 
and the image. For that sake the constructive the­
ory of dignity must in its own turn differentiate 
modes (or levels) of self-consciousness. It is justi­
fied to consider at least three of them: self-percep­
tion, introspection and self-understanding.
At the self-perception level dignity is represent­
ed as a special mode to relation to the self; a per­
sonal or a collective setting on self-esteem connect­
ed with posting some certain moral requirement or 
criteria to the self. This process involves the forma­
tion of a stable self-esteem stemming from a fair­
ly rigid, sometimes critical, self-assessment and 
internal design of measures to improve it, that is 
some “working on self”.
At the introspection level (mind that we should 
not mix this with psychological introspection 
which means registering changes in one’s emo­
tions or thoughts) through witnessing the process 
of self-esteem growing, its variations and crises, a 
person primarily generalizes one’s image of dig­
nity to become an idea or concept. The latter then 
can act as the integral principle of evaluating both 
the self and the others. In other words, the feeling 
of dignity transforms in some conceptual defini­
tion of dignity, possessing a repertoire of verbal 
and image connotations. In a personal scale this 
generalization can bear expressive emotional and 
aesthetic coloring (evaluation of actions in terms 
of “beauty”, “style”, etc.). In a group scale it is also 
implemented in the artistic, fiction discourse filled 
with symbols and allegories of qualities preferred 
for this community.
At the self-understanding level the separate 
verbal definitions and figurative connotations 
of human dignity fit into the conceptual struc­
ture of dignity as a universal principle applicable
for the design of large-scale forms of personal, 
social, group, national, civilizational develop­
ment. It is undoubtedly the most complex level, 
because on its way to the universal principle the 
idea of dignity should, in a sense, escape from 
the close interconnectedness with a repertoire of 
images, but not to stay in this bloodless theoret­
ical formula.
Third, what must provide an increase in 
self-awareness in the transition to still higher level 
is the reflection of dignity. Its theoretical expres­
sion should be such a structural concept, in which 
the idea of dignity-values does not substantiate it 
in private images, “cases”, examples, but stays sig­
nificant and justified in itself, and at the same time 
embodies in visual images, eloquent stories, para­
bles etc. needed for educational work.
3. Conclusions
Constructive theory of dignity should surely take 
into account the benefits of the activity approach, 
while avoiding its limitations. Human dignity can­
not be reduced to its readiness to fulfill social func­
tions. Universal correlate of human dignity could 
be generalized as a notion of the human person as 
the creator of history, civilization and culture, the 
“author” of a set of good and useful artifacts that 
fill the life-world of mankind: from stone tools to 
the modern technologies. It means that the activity 
approach developed by contemporary philosophic 
anthropology and other disciplines can be mod­
ified with the reference to the concept of human 
creativity. Human dignity is increasingly provided 
by the creative potential of the whole mankind, its 
ability to find adequate answers to the global and 
local challenges, to demonstrate movement to a 
more equitable, harmonious social and socio-nat­
ural world.
Thus, the theory of human dignity is no longer 
a derivative, side branch of a philosophical of so­
ciological doctrine. On the contrary, the discourse 
of dignity often serves as some tool for adjusting 
a doctrine, some kind of “test for humanity”. The 
problem of dignity in its modern interpretation 
does not imply a purely conceptual, theoretical 
solution but focuses on the development of syntet- 
ic approaches involving law, sociological, anthro­
pological, medical, psychological and pedagogical 
knowledge, relevant forms and methods of educa­
tional work, and art, technology, public communi­
cations as well.
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